When you see an action being committed that strikes you as inherently wrong and misguided, what is your obligation to act in response to it? What if you’re in a position to prevent or thwart it? Is it your obligation to act within your means to do so?
Congressional Democrats face this dilemma. With the lone exception of Senator Lieberman, they uniformly oppose the president’s adjusted strategy in Iraq and it is generally within their power to not only thwart its implementation but to even end our involvement in Iraq altogether.(1) Given this position, what are they to do? What are they compelled to do?
If their intent is to serve the nation’s interest and it is their conviction that sending more troops into Baghdad–and remaining in Iraq altogether–contradicts the national interest than they must act to prevent the surge and bring our forces home, or propose an alternative strategy. Courage and faithfulness to conviction obligates them to. After all, if you judge something to be wrong should you not act within your means to end it or at least prevent its propagation?
Well, apparently not. Democrats fulminate that not only is sending twenty-thousand more troops to Baghdad wrong, but that success in Iraq is no longer possible and that we ought to "redeploy" our forces precipitously. Logically, that means they would exercise their legislative powers to not only prevent our presence in Iraq from increasing, but to end it completely. As Rep. Dennis Kucinich has declared, "It is simply not credible to maintain that one opposes the war, yet continues to fund it. If you oppose the war, then don’t vote to fund it."
But in actuality the Democrats’ rhetoric does not extend beyond that; mere rhetoric. Instead of backing their words with action, non-binding resolutions have been introduced in both houses of Congress expressing their respective chambers’ opposition. That is not anything more than rhetoric in legal form. Either they are not willing to follow their principles in pursuit of serving the national interest or they do not have principles whatsoever beyond the pursuit of their own political interest.(2)
The latter seems to be the case. Unwilling to take any responsibility for the situation in Iraq and accept the potential political ramifications that might ensue should they translate their bombastic rhetoric into action, the Democrats in Congress freely polemicize yet conspicuously decline to follow through with constructive action of their own in an attempt to attain cheap political benefit.
After interviewing Rep. Rahm Emanuel, the architect of the Democrats’ ‘06 victories in the House, David Ignatius characterized the Democrats’ approach to Iraq as such. "The country is angry, and it will only get more so as the problems in Iraq deepen. Don't look to Emanuel's Democrats for solutions on Iraq. It's Bush's war, and as it splinters the structure of GOP power, the Democrats are waiting to pick up the pieces."
If that is true than congressional Democrats are deliberately positioning themselves to gain politically from American failure and defeat. Victory or, if you prefer, shirking complete disaster in Iraq is undeniably in America’s interest, but the Democrats’ strategy is to refuse to do anything to accomplish either because it would run counter to their political interest. Ostensibly at least, they are putting party over nation.
This nakedly partisan and political approach would not even be that offensive if its consequences were limited only to domestic electoral politics. They are not though. Democratic strategies to score politically from failure in Iraq can only harm our men and women fighting in Iraq. When American soldiers are fighting and dying in a foreign land, their political leaders back home have an obligation to either support them absolutely or bring them home, whichever option their conviction leads them to take. Matters as grave and serious as war and peace mandate that the nation’s political leaders demonstrate decisive, principled leadership; not partisan and political opportunism guised as governance.
If congressional Democrats wish to take the public stance that our men and women in Iraq must come home than they must act within their means to effect that outcome. If they are not prepared to do this than they have an obligation to do all they can to support the American soldier serving in Iraq, or at the very least, should abstain from cutting him off at the knees. He deserves nothing less.
(1) Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution enumerates that "Congress shall have Power To...provide fore the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." It is entirely within Congress’ power to simply stop appropriating for the Iraq war, as the Congress did in Vietnam.
(2) This is not to say that I believe America should "redeploy" from Iraq now or in the coming months, only that the Democratic majority in Congress which does, on balance, believe that, or at least publicly endorses and advocates the proposition, should act within their means to effect that outcome.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
A New Approach in Iraq
However much I have supported and defended the administration’s strategy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam in April ‘03—and continue to support our original goal of allowing for a stable, peaceful democracy to take hold there—the lack of clear political progress since the ratification of a permanent constitution and the perpetual deterioration of security on the ground, especially in and around Baghdad, leads me to no other conclusion than that our effort in Iraq is in need of a new strategy. Because it is the prevalence of violence which has prevented any tangible or visible political progress, that new strategy must focus upon forcefully ending the rampant sectarian violence that has permeated Baghdad and the insurgency that has given it cause. Accordingly, I would endorse the proposal posited by retired general Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan of a true"clear and hold" military approach with the requisite increase in American troops that would make this approach feasible. An increased force level is, as I now concede, long overdue and absolutely vital if the United States still intends to fulfill our original mission, which is in both the Iraqis’ and our own national interest.
Since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in April of 2003, the main emphasis of American strategy has been to train Iraqi security forces to provide for their own nation’s security as rapidly as possible, a point that once reached would then make it possible and appropriate for American forces to come home. This always has been and should continue to be the objective. But for it to be effective, and for democratic institutions and habits to be given the environment to grow and take hold, the American military must provide basic security on the ground in the interim, until Iraqis have reached the requisite level of competence.
For the want of enough manpower, we have not been able to provide it, and a security vacuum now exists in Iraq. The largely Sunni based insurgency has focused its attacks on the predominant Shiite community and, in response, Shiites have felt compelled to turn to Shiite militias to provide security from Sunni attacks. The end result has been a bloody cycle of sectarian-based retribution, kidnaping, murder, and execution between Sunni and Shiite militias.
This cycle is out of control, and though progress behind the headlines is being made, democracy will not succeed in Iraq unless the Shiite-Sunni sectarian war is brought to an end—forcefully. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol have observed, "Unless the majority of Iraqis can be protected from terrorist bombers, insurgents, and death squads, they will not be able to negotiate and sustain any political solution." Iraqis want to be free and they want to live in peace and security. If we do not provide that until the Iraqi security and military forces can, than they will turn to the sectarian militias to do it.
Everything hinges upon securing Baghdad. Quoting Frederick Kagan, "about 80 percent of violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million." To secure Baghdad, an increase in the amount of American forces in and around the capitol is requisite to effectively clearing the area of insurgents and sectarian militias and then holding it so they do not return. Our previous attempt at this, "Operation Together Forward," failed because there were not enough American troops to hold the streets and neighborhoods that had been cleared, allowing the insurgents and militias to creep back in.
A larger, reinforced American military presence in Baghdad should be able to rectify this, and effectively hold the cleared streets and neighborhoods that "Operation Together Forward" failed to.
Our previous experience in Iraq confirms this. Borrowing from Kagan and Kristol once more, "When U.S. forces in adequate numbers, together with Iraqi troops, cleared Tal Afar, Mosul, Falluja, Sadr City, and Najaf in 2004 and 2005, levels of violence in those areas dropped enormously. Economic activity picked up. Political leaders, rather than militia commanders, took charge."
None of this is to say that simply sending more American men and women to Baghdad is a silver bullet. Creating a larger presence is only half as important as what you do with that presence or who is leading it. On the latter point, President Bush has already made the decision to replace the current commanders on the ground, Generals Casey and Abizaid, with General George Petraeus.
This is a good start, but alone not enough. The newly reinforced American forces must also be tasked to go on the offensive, with the rules of engagement allowing them to take down insurgents and militia members and, most importantly, their leaders without undue restraint.
Moreover, the president’s likely plan to send additional forces to Baghdad is being commonly described as a troop "surge." This connotes a temporary increase—a blip—in the number of troops commissioned to secure Baghdad. This will do no good. Tom Donnelly is correct in emphasizing that, at this point, "The war can be lost in the next six months, but it cannot be won in the next six months." If increasing the amount of American troops in and around Baghdad is to make any difference at all those forces have to be given the time they need to accomplish their mission. An artificial timeline or a premature withdrawal will have rendered their deployment pointless.
A deployment of additional forces to Baghdad, given the time and the license to clear the area of insurgents and militias and prevent their return, is the only option we have left if we are to achieve our original goal in Iraq and the Iraqi people are to create a self-sustaining government. The only other option is a precipitous retreat from Iraq and all the chaos and bloodshed that would ensue.
From all indications, the president understands this and is prepared to act accordingly. Whatever issues can be taken with his tactics and strategy in Iraq to date, there can be no question that his heart has always been in the right place and that his political and moral courage regarding our venture in Iraq are indispensable. He has been willing to gamble everything—a second term, his presidency, his legacy—on creating a free and peaceful Iraq that will respect the lives and liberties of its own citizens and its neighbors. Political leadership of this courage and valor has always been rare, especially in these times. Whatever mistakes the president has made following the fall of Saddam, he deserves credit and appreciation for his persistence and determination to achieve victory in Iraq, a victory not many political leaders in America seem interested in anymore.
I would urge my fellow Americans to support him and this new effort, if for no other reason than because failing in Iraq would produce costs more catastrophic than this nation can bear. Victory is the only option.
********
Since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in April of 2003, the main emphasis of American strategy has been to train Iraqi security forces to provide for their own nation’s security as rapidly as possible, a point that once reached would then make it possible and appropriate for American forces to come home. This always has been and should continue to be the objective. But for it to be effective, and for democratic institutions and habits to be given the environment to grow and take hold, the American military must provide basic security on the ground in the interim, until Iraqis have reached the requisite level of competence.
For the want of enough manpower, we have not been able to provide it, and a security vacuum now exists in Iraq. The largely Sunni based insurgency has focused its attacks on the predominant Shiite community and, in response, Shiites have felt compelled to turn to Shiite militias to provide security from Sunni attacks. The end result has been a bloody cycle of sectarian-based retribution, kidnaping, murder, and execution between Sunni and Shiite militias.
This cycle is out of control, and though progress behind the headlines is being made, democracy will not succeed in Iraq unless the Shiite-Sunni sectarian war is brought to an end—forcefully. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol have observed, "Unless the majority of Iraqis can be protected from terrorist bombers, insurgents, and death squads, they will not be able to negotiate and sustain any political solution." Iraqis want to be free and they want to live in peace and security. If we do not provide that until the Iraqi security and military forces can, than they will turn to the sectarian militias to do it.
Everything hinges upon securing Baghdad. Quoting Frederick Kagan, "about 80 percent of violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million." To secure Baghdad, an increase in the amount of American forces in and around the capitol is requisite to effectively clearing the area of insurgents and sectarian militias and then holding it so they do not return. Our previous attempt at this, "Operation Together Forward," failed because there were not enough American troops to hold the streets and neighborhoods that had been cleared, allowing the insurgents and militias to creep back in.
A larger, reinforced American military presence in Baghdad should be able to rectify this, and effectively hold the cleared streets and neighborhoods that "Operation Together Forward" failed to.
Our previous experience in Iraq confirms this. Borrowing from Kagan and Kristol once more, "When U.S. forces in adequate numbers, together with Iraqi troops, cleared Tal Afar, Mosul, Falluja, Sadr City, and Najaf in 2004 and 2005, levels of violence in those areas dropped enormously. Economic activity picked up. Political leaders, rather than militia commanders, took charge."
None of this is to say that simply sending more American men and women to Baghdad is a silver bullet. Creating a larger presence is only half as important as what you do with that presence or who is leading it. On the latter point, President Bush has already made the decision to replace the current commanders on the ground, Generals Casey and Abizaid, with General George Petraeus.
This is a good start, but alone not enough. The newly reinforced American forces must also be tasked to go on the offensive, with the rules of engagement allowing them to take down insurgents and militia members and, most importantly, their leaders without undue restraint.
Moreover, the president’s likely plan to send additional forces to Baghdad is being commonly described as a troop "surge." This connotes a temporary increase—a blip—in the number of troops commissioned to secure Baghdad. This will do no good. Tom Donnelly is correct in emphasizing that, at this point, "The war can be lost in the next six months, but it cannot be won in the next six months." If increasing the amount of American troops in and around Baghdad is to make any difference at all those forces have to be given the time they need to accomplish their mission. An artificial timeline or a premature withdrawal will have rendered their deployment pointless.
A deployment of additional forces to Baghdad, given the time and the license to clear the area of insurgents and militias and prevent their return, is the only option we have left if we are to achieve our original goal in Iraq and the Iraqi people are to create a self-sustaining government. The only other option is a precipitous retreat from Iraq and all the chaos and bloodshed that would ensue.
From all indications, the president understands this and is prepared to act accordingly. Whatever issues can be taken with his tactics and strategy in Iraq to date, there can be no question that his heart has always been in the right place and that his political and moral courage regarding our venture in Iraq are indispensable. He has been willing to gamble everything—a second term, his presidency, his legacy—on creating a free and peaceful Iraq that will respect the lives and liberties of its own citizens and its neighbors. Political leadership of this courage and valor has always been rare, especially in these times. Whatever mistakes the president has made following the fall of Saddam, he deserves credit and appreciation for his persistence and determination to achieve victory in Iraq, a victory not many political leaders in America seem interested in anymore.
I would urge my fellow Americans to support him and this new effort, if for no other reason than because failing in Iraq would produce costs more catastrophic than this nation can bear. Victory is the only option.
Saturday, January 06, 2007
The Minimum Wage
Among the items on Speaker Pelosi’s "First 100 Hours" legislative agenda is a hike in the federal minimum wage. I have no doubt that the Speaker and the new Democratic majority in the House have nothing but the best intentions behind this, but raising the minimum wage is an inherently bad idea.
At best, it will have little, if any effect or benefit upon those for whom it was intended to—low-wage workers trying to make ends meet. As George Will points out, "Most of the working poor earn more than the minimum wage, and most of the .06% (479,000 in 2005) of America’s wage workers earning the minimum wage are not poor. Only one in five workers earning the federal minimum wage live in families with household earnings below the poverty line." Beyond even that, 29 states already have minimum wages above the federal level and most workers who do earn the minimum wage are teenagers or young adults, not the major breadwinners of the household. As Rich Lowry observes, "The effect of the hike basically will be to give a small boost to the wage of teenagers working summer or after school."
At worst, a hike will hurt low-wage workers, new entrants into the workforce, and the economy as a whole. A minimum wage hike will cause businesses to raise the prices of their products and services to cover the increased costs of labor. Businesses rarely simply absorb increased costs, and if the minimum wage increases you can expect it will be the average consumer who will end up paying that increase.
Another unintended victim of a hike will be small businesses and their minimum wage earning employees, or those aspiring to be such. Most small businesses cannot simply absorb an increase in the cost of labor, even if they were benevolent enough to do so. They will be forced to either lay off those minimum wage earners in their employ whose wages now exceed what they can afford or they will simply not hire any new workers in the present or future. Those earning the minimum wage will be taking home more, but there will be fewer of them employed than there had been under the previous wage.
The intrinsic flaw in the whole idea of raising the minimum wage, and maybe in the concept of having a minimum wage altogether, is that labor is no different from any other economic commodity—its value and price is determined by the market. Raising the minimum wage is no less odious and no less harmful to the economy than government price controls. Government intervention only harms an economic market, or aggravates further a problem it was intended to remedy.
This is an inescapable lesson of our own history from the past century. Credit to Speaker Pelosi and her colleagues for their noble intentions, but a government-decreed, artificial wage hike will only harm the very people it was intended to aid, and everyone else for that matter. I agree with George Will: "Washington, which has its hands full delivering the mail and defending the shores, should let the market do well what Washington does poorly." The market will take care of itself and those within it so long as it is allowed to do so by government.
I would urge the House and the Congress against passing a federal minimum wage hike and, if one is passed, I would urge the president to veto it.
At best, it will have little, if any effect or benefit upon those for whom it was intended to—low-wage workers trying to make ends meet. As George Will points out, "Most of the working poor earn more than the minimum wage, and most of the .06% (479,000 in 2005) of America’s wage workers earning the minimum wage are not poor. Only one in five workers earning the federal minimum wage live in families with household earnings below the poverty line." Beyond even that, 29 states already have minimum wages above the federal level and most workers who do earn the minimum wage are teenagers or young adults, not the major breadwinners of the household. As Rich Lowry observes, "The effect of the hike basically will be to give a small boost to the wage of teenagers working summer or after school."
At worst, a hike will hurt low-wage workers, new entrants into the workforce, and the economy as a whole. A minimum wage hike will cause businesses to raise the prices of their products and services to cover the increased costs of labor. Businesses rarely simply absorb increased costs, and if the minimum wage increases you can expect it will be the average consumer who will end up paying that increase.
Another unintended victim of a hike will be small businesses and their minimum wage earning employees, or those aspiring to be such. Most small businesses cannot simply absorb an increase in the cost of labor, even if they were benevolent enough to do so. They will be forced to either lay off those minimum wage earners in their employ whose wages now exceed what they can afford or they will simply not hire any new workers in the present or future. Those earning the minimum wage will be taking home more, but there will be fewer of them employed than there had been under the previous wage.
The intrinsic flaw in the whole idea of raising the minimum wage, and maybe in the concept of having a minimum wage altogether, is that labor is no different from any other economic commodity—its value and price is determined by the market. Raising the minimum wage is no less odious and no less harmful to the economy than government price controls. Government intervention only harms an economic market, or aggravates further a problem it was intended to remedy.
This is an inescapable lesson of our own history from the past century. Credit to Speaker Pelosi and her colleagues for their noble intentions, but a government-decreed, artificial wage hike will only harm the very people it was intended to aid, and everyone else for that matter. I agree with George Will: "Washington, which has its hands full delivering the mail and defending the shores, should let the market do well what Washington does poorly." The market will take care of itself and those within it so long as it is allowed to do so by government.
I would urge the House and the Congress against passing a federal minimum wage hike and, if one is passed, I would urge the president to veto it.
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