A New Approach in Iraq

However much I have supported and defended the administration’s strategy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam in April ‘03—and continue to support our original goal of allowing for a stable, peaceful democracy to take hold there—the lack of clear political progress since the ratification of a permanent constitution and the perpetual deterioration of security on the ground, especially in and around Baghdad, leads me to no other conclusion than that our effort in Iraq is in need of a new strategy. Because it is the prevalence of violence which has prevented any tangible or visible political progress, that new strategy must focus upon forcefully ending the rampant sectarian violence that has permeated Baghdad and the insurgency that has given it cause. Accordingly, I would endorse the proposal posited by retired general Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan of a true"clear and hold" military approach with the requisite increase in American troops that would make this approach feasible. An increased force level is, as I now concede, long overdue and absolutely vital if the United States still intends to fulfill our original mission, which is in both the Iraqis’ and our own national interest.

********

Since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in April of 2003, the main emphasis of American strategy has been to train Iraqi security forces to provide for their own nation’s security as rapidly as possible, a point that once reached would then make it possible and appropriate for American forces to come home. This always has been and should continue to be the objective. But for it to be effective, and for democratic institutions and habits to be given the environment to grow and take hold, the American military must provide basic security on the ground in the interim, until Iraqis have reached the requisite level of competence.

For the want of enough manpower, we have not been able to provide it, and a security vacuum now exists in Iraq. The largely Sunni based insurgency has focused its attacks on the predominant Shiite community and, in response, Shiites have felt compelled to turn to Shiite militias to provide security from Sunni attacks. The end result has been a bloody cycle of sectarian-based retribution, kidnaping, murder, and execution between Sunni and Shiite militias.

This cycle is out of control, and though progress behind the headlines is being made, democracy will not succeed in Iraq unless the Shiite-Sunni sectarian war is brought to an end—forcefully. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol have observed, "Unless the majority of Iraqis can be protected from terrorist bombers, insurgents, and death squads, they will not be able to negotiate and sustain any political solution." Iraqis want to be free and they want to live in peace and security. If we do not provide that until the Iraqi security and military forces can, than they will turn to the sectarian militias to do it.

Everything hinges upon securing Baghdad. Quoting Frederick Kagan, "about 80 percent of violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million." To secure Baghdad, an increase in the amount of American forces in and around the capitol is requisite to effectively clearing the area of insurgents and sectarian militias and then holding it so they do not return. Our previous attempt at this, "Operation Together Forward," failed because there were not enough American troops to hold the streets and neighborhoods that had been cleared, allowing the insurgents and militias to creep back in.

A larger, reinforced American military presence in Baghdad should be able to rectify this, and effectively hold the cleared streets and neighborhoods that "Operation Together Forward" failed to.

Our previous experience in Iraq confirms this. Borrowing from Kagan and Kristol once more, "When U.S. forces in adequate numbers, together with Iraqi troops, cleared Tal Afar, Mosul, Falluja, Sadr City, and Najaf in 2004 and 2005, levels of violence in those areas dropped enormously. Economic activity picked up. Political leaders, rather than militia commanders, took charge."

None of this is to say that simply sending more American men and women to Baghdad is a silver bullet. Creating a larger presence is only half as important as what you do with that presence or who is leading it. On the latter point, President Bush has already made the decision to replace the current commanders on the ground, Generals Casey and Abizaid, with General George Petraeus.

This is a good start, but alone not enough. The newly reinforced American forces must also be tasked to go on the offensive, with the rules of engagement allowing them to take down insurgents and militia members and, most importantly, their leaders without undue restraint.

Moreover, the president’s likely plan to send additional forces to Baghdad is being commonly described as a troop "surge." This connotes a temporary increase—a blip—in the number of troops commissioned to secure Baghdad. This will do no good. Tom Donnelly is correct in emphasizing that, at this point, "The war can be lost in the next six months, but it cannot be won in the next six months." If increasing the amount of American troops in and around Baghdad is to make any difference at all those forces have to be given the time they need to accomplish their mission. An artificial timeline or a premature withdrawal will have rendered their deployment pointless.

A deployment of additional forces to Baghdad, given the time and the license to clear the area of insurgents and militias and prevent their return, is the only option we have left if we are to achieve our original goal in Iraq and the Iraqi people are to create a self-sustaining government. The only other option is a precipitous retreat from Iraq and all the chaos and bloodshed that would ensue.

From all indications, the president understands this and is prepared to act accordingly. Whatever issues can be taken with his tactics and strategy in Iraq to date, there can be no question that his heart has always been in the right place and that his political and moral courage regarding our venture in Iraq are indispensable. He has been willing to gamble everything—a second term, his presidency, his legacy—on creating a free and peaceful Iraq that will respect the lives and liberties of its own citizens and its neighbors. Political leadership of this courage and valor has always been rare, especially in these times. Whatever mistakes the president has made following the fall of Saddam, he deserves credit and appreciation for his persistence and determination to achieve victory in Iraq, a victory not many political leaders in America seem interested in anymore.

I would urge my fellow Americans to support him and this new effort, if for no other reason than because failing in Iraq would produce costs more catastrophic than this nation can bear. Victory is the only option.