If the administration’s end is to effect the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program, then the recent agreement with them and our policy and behavior since could not be more self-defeating. Presumably, the end we seek is to compel the North Korean regime to disassemble its nuclear program through peaceful, diplomatic means. If this end is possible—if the rogue regime of King Jong Il can be peacefully convinced to simply disavow its nuclear possession—then the means being presently employed will not suffice.
We can know this because we tried our current approach once before—under the Clinton administration—and it failed. There we gave them various forms of material aid in return for their pledge to end development of a nuclear arsenal. Before the ink had dried on the treaty however, they violated it and now have developed such an arsenal.
None of us should be surprised, for the agreement had little to no chance of success. Our policy and approach was entirely wrong. We were not firm, resolved, nor tough with the North Koreans; which is the one way you command the respect and compliance of a rogue regime.
Kim Jong Il and company judged that there would be no penalty for their malfeasance; that America’s noble desire to remedy problems and conflicts peacefully and diplomatically would prevent us from acting forthrightly against non-compliance or even to pursue a course of strict enforcement of the agreement. In fact, a nuclear program was and is a meal ticket through which carrots and concessions can be accumulated through blackmail and distortion.
They judged correctly. Further, if they could gain concessions through the simple public desire to have nuclear weapons, then what is to say they could not get that and more once they actually possessed nuclear weapons? So the development went on.
Quoting the editors at OpinionJournal, "Pyongyang's pattern has long been to admit as little as possible every step of the way, and then insist that the U.S. must make further concessions at every instance."1 Their approach: Take advantage of America’s good intentions and peaceful inclinations. Develop weapons and gain concessions from America in return for a promise to stop. Never actually stop and after a while possess weapons. Promise to dismantle that weapons program in return for even more concessions without negative consequences for lying in first agreement, but never actually dismantle the program. Blackmail America some more now and in the future. Keep doing so.
This is their game, and so long as we participate in it they will win. Nuclear weapons are their means through which to extract what they want from a compliant United States. By agreeing to provide material aid to the regime, and to foreswear punitive measures, we only give them more reason to maintain their nuclear capacity.
This policy could not be more counterproductive, especially now. We cannot expect them to dismantle when we give them no incentive, or provide no credible threat of penalty, to do so. Under our first agreement we gave them carrots to cease their nuclear development. They did not cease that development and now have nuclear weapons. Now we have agreed to give them more carrots to dismantle their program, without introducing any negative consequences for violating the last one. With no penalty and all the incentive to, the North Koreans will violate this agreement like they violated the last.
To wit, they already are. Per provision of the Bush Administration’s agreement with the North, they were obligated to close down a nuclear reactor weeks ago. They did not. Instead of any penalization for this, the deadline was extended and we acquiesced to their demand to unfreeze assets the regime had accumulated through its comprehensive criminal activity, which was never stipulated to in the agreement. Not only are we not enforcing the mandates of the agreement, and thereby acquiescing to their violation, we are making further concessions beyond those already agreed to.
What kind of diplomacy is this? Far from compelling the end of the regime’s arsenal, this policy only encourages its perpetuation. By appeasing the regime, we are projecting weakness. They will never fulfill their promises so long as we reward and re-enforce continued malfeasance. From their standpoint, why get rid of a mechanism which garners you material and non-material concessions without any negative consequences?
Those in favor of this backwards policy and behavior argue that it is necessary to maintain a dialogue and de-escalate tensions between the two nations. But to what end? Dialogue and diplomacy are simply means to an end, not an end in themselves. What advantage is there in an ongoing dialogue with the North that does not only accomplish nothing, but actually encourages them to maintain their program?
The incentive to defiance must stop. The North Korean regime is a criminal, despotic, and belligerent regime. They have no interest in peace or diplomacy. They do not share our interests and any dialogue or negotiation with them is not entered into in good faith. Their sole interest is the propagation of their own power and the existence and the multiplication of their wealth.
We must abandon the policy that makes nuclear capacity a means to that end. A complete reversal is in order, and no less than one will suffice. As the editors at National Review pointed out, "If the new deal had required North Korea to close its reactor and destroy its existing nuclear arsenal before receiving any aid, it would have been worth signing. But of course Kim hasn’t promised to dismantle the existing bombs, precisely because they are both the best guarantor of his power and his strongest leverage against us."2 Our present agreement with them must be vacated, they have already departed from it anyway. Instead of giving the regime carrots for maintaining a nuclear program, we must make it clear as glass that their nuclear program must be dismantled in its totality. Then, and only then, will they receive any carrots from us.
This doctrine makes the incentive clear. Have a nuclear program, you get nothing but sanction and isolation. Give it up and there will be a reward. It is a simple choice.
The possibility of an Iranian nuclear capacity makes this approach doubly incumbent. Adopting a forceful position with North Korea will send the message that the development of a nuclear arsenal will not be rewarded and that the United States will not be taken advantage of or blackmailed. Following the current approach will send the exact opposite message. Quoting Jason Lee Steorts, the current policy "announces to any would-be proliferator that a country possessed of atomic bombs can defy the United States and claim a reward for its defiance."3
Iran appears to have disparate intentions behind its program. Though there may be ancillary material motivations behind their pursuit for nuclear weapons, the deciding factor seems to be—unlike North Korea’s material purposes to blackmail material provision from the United States—regional political theological gain. North Korea seeks power and wealth, Iran envisions nuclear capacity as a means towards emerging as the dominant power in the Middle East with the ability to spread its version of Islamic Revolution. Reul Marc Gerecht has observed that "modern Middle Eastern—and especially Iranian—history clearly shows that ideology has run roughshod over economic pragmatism."4 If material gain is not their prime motivation, then neither is material incentive likely to persuade them to abandon it.
But this in no way diminishes the desideratum for principle with North Korea. Though the approach I advocate is material in nature, it is a projection of strength and resolution as well. Former national security advisor and secretary of state Henry Kissinger5 has correctly asserted in a piece titled "Iran Despises Weakness" that a demonstration of some credible strength is requisite in diplomatically compelling Iran to abandon its nuclear aspirations. The editors of National Review echo this as well. "Only once [the mullahs] have something to fear will they consider making a deal."6
The best way to demonstrate this strength credibly is to legitimately project it through material means tailored to the circumstances with the North, which will in turn demonstrate a readiness to exhibit it with Iran as well. As we will not tolerate nuclear capacity with the North, we will not tolerate it with the Iranians either. Our current policy projects only impotence. Why should the mullahs believe that we will be resolute with them when we are not even willing to withhold carrots from the North Korean regime for its defiance?
When nothing short of absolute resolution by the United States—and the international community for that matter—can prevent the Iranians from realizing their nuclear goals, our present policy with the North Korea could not be more dissonant and self-defeating. If we have any intention of seeing North Korea dismantle its nuclear program and of projecting an image that will allow us to thwart the Iranians and their nuclear development then we must reverse our present policy with the North. We live in an age too fraught with peril to be projecting and demonstrating weakness.
1. Editorial, (2007, April 13). Kim's $25 Million. OpinionJournal, Retrieved April 20, 2007, from http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009934.
2. The Editors, (2007, February 14). Agreeing to the Same Framework. National Review Online, Retrieved April 20, 2007, from http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZjliMGZmYzdjYzEwNGY1YzBhNDBlZTY2MmZiMmIyMGI=.
3. Steorts, Jason Lee (2007, May 14). Axis Uber Alles?. National Review, LIX(8), 26-7.
4. Gerecht, Reul Mark (2006, April 24). To Bomb, or Not to Bomb. The Weekly Standard, 11(30), 16-24.
5. Kissinger, Henry (2006, November 19). Iran Despises Weakness. Sunday Times Online, Retrieved April 20, 2007, from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article641514.ece.
6. The Editors, (2007, June 1). Iran Takes Prisoners (Again). National Review Online, Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MWFhYjY2M2I3M2E5NDYwNThlZmE5ZWViYmU4MGFiYzg=.
